It was recognized at the outset that it might be difficult to reach a group consensus, either in the analysis or in the findings. As is stated in the Forwarding Section of the unclassified report, we encountered not a shred of evidence of culpable neglect or incompetence. Quite frankly, we were apprehensive that the critical tone which this resulted in could be misinterpreted as an indictment of the able and brave men who planned and executed this operation. However, since our purpose was to help identify lessons learned for future application, we included in our report all that we considered significant. In some cases the Group concluded that with respect to the questions raised on an issue, there was no better way of handling the problem, or what was done had little or no influence on the outcome. I'd like to point out that not all of these 23 issues were criticisms per se. These are all listed and discussed in the Analysis section of the unclassified report. Eventually we arrived at about two dozen issues which we considered significant. Our approach was to concentrate on those things that troubled us professionally about the mission - areas in which there appeared to be weaknesses. We reviewed all documents relating to the planning and execution of the mission, interviewed participants, examined types of equipment used, and observed exercises typical of the kinds of operations conducted. Our focus was essentially within the Department of Defense and primarily on military issues. We were not chartered to produce a white paper examining the Iranian hostage crisis at the national level. This brings me to another point I wish to clarify.
Nor had we known about it before the fact.įor the purposes of our review, we were cleared for the highest levels of classified, and given access to all sources of information and to any person within the Department of Defense.
None had been associated in any way with the planning, preparation, or conduct of this particular operation. Each obviously had a unique set of credentials, and each could focus his individual efforts accordingly. In combination, the Group possessed wide experience in military operations, and especially clandestine or special operations. You’ll find the complete biography of each member at Annex B in your document. Our purpose was to independently appraise the rescue attempt so we could recommend improvements in planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling any such operations in the future.Īs for membership, our Group consisted of six flag and general officers representing all four Services. We were chartered by the Joint Chiefs to do an essentially forward-looking, no-holds-barred assessment of the attempted rescue operation. Those findings-in fact, the entire Executive Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendation sections of the original classified report-remain, in this public version, virtually intact as we submitted them.īefore I discuss the findings, let me give you some more background on the Review Group and its mission.
#The hostage 1967 full
There has been a careful-and I think successful-effort to provide the American public with the full sense of our deliberations and our findings. However, this unclassified version is organized in exactly the same form as what was submitted by the Review Group, and involved only deletions of classified material and occasional word changes to retain continuity or protect sensitive operational subjects. You have an unclassified version of a highly classified report which has been sanitized within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. HOLLOWAY, III, USN (Ret.)ĬHAIRMAN, SPECIAL OPERATIONS REVIEW GROUPĪt the outset, let me clarify that the document which you have received is not the verbatim report of the Special Operations Review Group.
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